Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 17

Issue 1

Article 6

1928

Specific Performance of a Contract to Sell Standing Timber for
Immediate Severance
William C. Scott

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Scott, William C. (1928) "Specific Performance of a Contract to Sell Standing Timber for Immediate
Severance," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 17: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol17/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO SELL
STANDING TIIMBER FOR IMIMEDIATE SEVERANCE
'The rule in regard to specific enforcement of a contract to
sell standing timber, where immediate severance is contemplated
by the'parties, can hardly be said to be well settled. Both in this
country and in England the proposition has been greatly controverted, and there is unquestionably a great conflict of authority.
The majority rule seems to be that such a sale is one of an
interest in land. In the case of Hirth v. Graham1 the plaintiff
sued for damages for a breach of a contract for'the sale of timber
and the defendant set up the statute of frauds. The court held,
after an extensive review of the authorities, that such a sale came
within the statute, as being the sale of an' interest in land, saying,
".

growing timber is regarded as an integral part of the

land upon which it stands, it is not subject'to the le-vy and sale
upon execution as chattel, property, it descends to the heir
with the ldnd, and passes to the vendee with the soil.
No ease is found in which it is suggested that sales with a view
to their (trees) immediate removal would not be within the
statute.,

.

. The question whether such a sale is a sale of an in-

terest in or concerning land should depend not upon the intention of the parties, but upon the'legal character of the subject
of the contract, which in the case of growing timber is that of
realty."2 The weight 6f authority supports this view.3 It will
be seen that under this view the time of severance does not seem
to be material.4 Logically following such a construction, the
courts are inclined to give specific performance of such contracts. 5 But in a number of jurisdictions, even though such a
sale is conceded to transfer an interest in land, specific performance will not be granted where the remedy at law appears to be
adequate and complete. 6
150 Ohio St. 57, 33 N. E. 90.
'Italics the writer's.
3Green v. Armstrong, '1 Denio 550; Bowers v. Bowers, 95 Pa. 477;
Kingsley v. H&olbrook, 45 X. 1l. 318, 86 Am. Dec. 183.
'See note to Purner-v. Percy, 17 Am. Rep. 595, for a review of the
earlier authorities.

aSt. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Mara Ltmber Co., 173 N. Y. 149;
Stuzart v. Penn4s, 91 Va. 688, 22 S. -E.509.
WMarthinson v. King, 150 Fed. 48, 82 C. C. A. 360.
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There is, however, a strong minority view, holding unqualifiedly that if an immediate severance of the timber is contemplated, the sale passes an interest in personalty. In the vanguard of the jurisdictions adhering to such a rule is Kentucky.1
The chief basis for thei'ule is stated by the court in the Gabbard
case at page 450 of the Kentucky Reports: "The rule by which
standing timber which is sold in contemplatioii of immediate
severance, is converted from realty into personalty, is founded
upon the equitable doctrine that that which was intended to be
donewill be considered as having been done." This rule is undoubtedly the law in a number of jurisdictions.8 Consequently,
because of this view, courts of equity are reluctant to intervene
and give specific performanceY
This minority doctrine prevailed in several states prior to
the enactment of the Sales Act. Where the Sales Act has been
adopted there certainly should be no doubt as to the status of
such contracts. Section 76, which is an exact copy of Section
62 of\the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, provides that the
term "goods" includes "emblements, industrial growing crops,
and things 'attached to or forming part of the land which aze
agreed to be' severed before sale or under contract of sale:" Unquestionably there is no ambiguity couched in this please, and
it is hard to see how any court deciding a case involving a sale
of timber for immediate severance could go astray in its interpretation.
But in the case of Schach v. Wolfi1 o the court disregarded
this provision of the Sales Act in deciding that such a sale of
timber was a sale of an interet in land. The court seemed to
prefer to follow a long line of former Wisconsin decisions rather
than the Act. This decision has been severely criticized for thus
disregarding the statute in a note in the Cornell Law Quarterly" The writer there said: "So construed (referring to the
correct interpretation) the section would embrace practically all
contracts 'of this kind, for it is very rare that a sale of trees is
T
Gabbard v. Sheffield, 179 Ky. 442, 200 S. W. 942; Cheatham v.
Heda, 203 Ky. 489, 263 S. W. 622.
69 Atl. 818; In re Benjamin, 140 Fed. 320.
£Douglas v. Humway, 13 Gray 498; Strause v. Berger, 222 Pa. 367,
'Paddock v. Davenport, 107 N. C.,710, 12 S. E. 464; Borner v. Canaday, 79 Miss. 222, 30 So. 638.
"173 Wis. 351, 181 N. W. 214.
.116 Cornell Law Quarterly 426.
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made where severance within a fairly short time is not intended.
This definition of goods was inserted undoubtedly in the act for
the express purpose. of doing away with the diversity of opinion
existing in the different states on this point at common law."
There are a number of English decisions construing this section
of the Sales Act cited.1 2 These authorities are agreed in holding
that such a sale is strictly one of personalty. In this country
there seems to be little or no authority construing this provision
of the act, but the leading text writers have followed with ap3
proval the English courts in their interpretation.'
But what of specific performance under this minority view?
If timber be considered as personal property, then damages are
usually -held to be an adequate relief.' 4 But this is not the case
where timber has a special value to the purchaser, or is unique
and cannot be obtained readily elsewhere.
In Strause v.
5
Berger' the court, after specifically holding the timber to be
personalty, granted specific performance because "the timber
had a special value to the plaintiff for the use for which he
bought it, because of its quality, and because of the difficulty of
procuring such timber in the locality in which his business was
conducted." This decision closely follows the reasoning in 1oil
v. Osburn,'6 another Pennsylvania case.
In conclusion it is submitted that although the weight of
authority holds a sale of standing timber for immediate severance
to be the sale of an interest in land, nevertheless, a strong minority, including Kentucky, adhere to the contrary rule. It would
seem that this minority rule represents the sounder view upon
the question. In such a sale the intention of the parties is clearly
that the timber be classed as personalty. The majority of the
courts still cling, however, to the view that this should not
govern, but that the inherent nature of the subject matter should
be the criterion. Such courts, after laying down this ironclad
assertion, seem to be fully content with it, reasoning that since
timber is attached to the soil, is not subject to levy and sale as
"Joncs v. TankeriZZNe, 2 Ch. 440 (1909); Morgan v. Russell & Son,
1 K. B. 357 (1909); Fredkin v. Gline, 18 Manitoba, 249, s.c. 8 Western
Law Rep. (Cpn.) 587.
"Burdick on Sales (3rd ed.) pp. 29-30; Tiffany on Sales, p. 76;
Williston
on Sales (2nd ed.) see. 62.
1
Paddock v. Davenport, supra.
"Supra.

1174 Pa. 580, 34 At. 31;.
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chattel property, descends to the heirs with the land, and passes
to the vendee with the soil, it is bound to be regarded as realty
in all cases.
Even before the enactment of the Sales Act this position
was questionable, but since the passage of that act, there can be
little doubt that it is untenable. Under the more equitable
minority view, equity's jurisdiction is really not interfered with.
The right to give specific performance where the remedy at law
is inadequate is still retained in all its vigor. This is, from a
practical viewpoint, the true criterion. The trend of the law
seems to be toward the minority rule.
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